Using survey data, we document that foreign-owned institutions became more pessimistic than locally owned institutions about the strength of the Brazilian currency around the 2002 presidential elections. As a result of their relative pessimism, foreignowned institutions made larger forecast errors. Consistent with the emergence of their relative pessimism, foreign investors heavily sold Brazilian stocks and the Brazilian currency in futures markets ahead of the 2002 elections. Periods of stronger foreign sell-o¤ were associated with larger equity price declines and larger depreciation of the Brazilian Real in spot and futures markets. These results are consistent with foreign investors' lack of knowledge of Brazilian institutions contributing to the sharp depreciation of the Brazilian currency and stock market ahead of the 2002 presidential elections.
Introduction
The crises of the 1990s engendered a substantial change of perspective in the analysis of emerging market crises. Before, crises were quickly attributed to macroeconomic mismanagement, particularly to unsustainable …scal imbalances. Afterward, economists began to seriously consider that some crises may be precipitated by self-ful…lling pessimistic expectations of foreign lenders. For example, a number of prominent economists blamed foreign investors for their role in the 1997 East Asian emerging market crisis (Bhagwati, 1998; Stiglitz, 1998; Rodrik, 1998; Radelet and Sachs, 1998) . Self-ful…lling lender-led crises can be rationalized by a variety of models, all of them exhibiting multiple equilibria. These models include those of Obstfeld (1986 Obstfeld ( , 1996 , Sachs, Tornell, and Velasco (1996) , Kehoe (1996, 2000) , Calvo and Mendoza (2000a,b) , Chang and Velasco (2001) , and Chang (2007) . 1 Along with a new generation of theoretical models, the crises of the 1990s stimulated a spurt of empirical research on the behavior of foreign investors in emerging markets, especially during crises. A short list of papers in this literature includes Choe, Kho, and Stulz (1999) , Kim and Wei (2002a,b) , Borensztein and Gelos (2003) , Kaminsky, Lyons, and Schmukler (2004) , Dvorak (2005) , Broner, Gelos, and Reinhart (2006) , and Froot and Ramadorai (2008) .
Two questions that permeate this line of research are whether foreign investors'trading is less information-based than that of locals, and whether trading by foreigners exacerbates crises in emerging markets. As we discuss later, evidence is mixed. Our study adds one data point to this literature. A novel feature of our work is the use of surveys of expectations of …nancial market participants. These surveys are conducted by the Central Bank of Brazil and include the major players in local …nancial markets.
We use surveys to compare the exchange rate expectations of locally and foreign-owned institutions around the 2002 Brazilian presidential elections. 2 Reports from that time reveal that expectations were heavily in ‡uenced by the potential victory of Luís Inácio "Lula" da Silva, a left-wing opposition candidate who emerged victorious in the elections. 3 We document that during that time period foreign-owned institutions were more pessimistic than locally owned ones about the strength of the Brazilian currency and made considerably We also document that foreigners'trading activity in …nancial markets was consistent with their expectations becoming more pessimistic than those of locals. Data on trading imbalances show that foreign investors substantially sold Brazilian equity and Brazilian currency (in the futures market) to local investors ahead of the 2002 presidential elections. Furthermore, we show that 10-day periods with stronger foreign sales (i.e., local purchases) of equity were associated with larger concurrent equity price reductions and larger depreciations of 2 Brazilian presidential elections occur in two rounds. All candidates participated in the …rst round, on October 6, 2002. The two top candidates from the …rst round, Jose Serra, from the incumbent centrist coalition, and Lula from the leftist Workers' Party, faced o¤ in the second round. On October 27, 2002 Lula was elected president, and his government would not break o¤ from the macroeconomic policies of previous administrations.
3 On June 6, 2002 Goldman Sachs announced the Lulameter, which "quanti…es the probability of a Lula victory that is currently being priced in by currency markets" (Tenengauzer, 2002) . The report concludes that "the market is being over-optimistic regarding the exchange rate in the event of a Lula victory" and recommends that "investors should protect against BRL exposure into the elections period." Martinez and Santiso (2003) 
Related literature
In this paper, evidence that foreigners' had "worse" expectations than locals during the Brazilian crisis in 2002 comes from survey data. In contrast, many studies address the ultimate question of whether foreign trading during a crisis is less information-based than that of locals by testing whether foreign investors engage in "momentum trading" or "herding behavior." These would be mechanical ways of trading that disregard economic fundamentals.
5
For example, Kim and Wei (2002a) and Choe, Kho, and Stulz (1999) use di¤erent datasets to test whether foreign investors in Korea tended to herd and follow momentum-like strategies in the period around the 1997 East Asian crisis. Kim and Wei (2002a) …nd evidence of herding and momentum before and during the crisis, whereas Choe, Kho, and Stulz (1999) …nd that foreigners engaged in momentum trading and herding prior to the crisis, but during 4 A dollar invested in the Brazilian IBOVESPA Stock Index in January 1, 2002 was worth 38 cents in September 30, 2002. Value was lost both because the IBOVESPA index lost 36% of its value in BRL and because the Brazilian Real lost 40% of its value relative to the dollar.
5 One di¢ culty with this approach is that the statistical results used to identify herding and momentum are also consistent with fully rational trading strategies that use information e¢ ciently. "Herding" could be due to investors responding to the same information. "Momentum-trading" could be due to investors following dynamic trading strategies that create convex payo¤ patterns (i.e., portfolio insurance a la Leland 1980) , or to foreign investors and market prices responding to a gradual build-up of credibility regarding a government commitment not to expropriate foreigners (Cherian and Perotti, 2001 ), or to informed investors breaking up orders to minimize the price impact of their trades (Kyle, 1985) . the crisis herding was somewhat reduced and momentum trading disappeared. Choe, Kho, and Stulz (1999) also document a strong foreign sell-o¤ and large price declines during the crisis. Authors of both articles conclude that foreign trading probably did not exacerbate the crisis either because foreigners held a relatively small part of the Korean stock market capitalization (Kim and Wei, 2002a) , or because, within the crisis period, days with large foreign net selling were not associated with more negative returns (Choe, Kho, and Stulz, 1999) .
6 Borensztein and Gelos (2003) use data on holdings of mutual funds investing in emerging markets and conclude that foreign investors engage in momentum trading and herding behavior. Kaminsky, Lyons, and Schmukler (2004) also document momentum trading by U.S. mutual funds investing in emerging markets and show that this behavior is due both to customer ‡ows and portfolio decisions by mutual fund managers.
Other than checking whether foreign investors follow seemingly mechanistic trading strategies, there are three alternative ways to assess the informational content of foreign trading.
First, Schmukler (1996, 2000) propose comparing the prices of closed-end country funds trading in the U.S. to the underlying prices of their emerging markets stocks. They conclude that locals are better informed than foreigners because emerging market stock prices lead closed-end fund prices.
Second, several authors investigate the relation between foreign trading ‡ows and future returns. Evidence is mixed. Using daily ‡ows of institutional investors in and out of 44 di¤erent countries, Froot, O'Connell, and Seasholes (2001) …nd evidence consistent with momentum trading, but because foreign purchases forecast future returns, they conclude that foreigners are likely to trade based on information not possessed by locals. In a follow-up paper, Froot and Ramadorai (2008) study the relation between cross-border equity ‡ows and domestic and foreign equity returns and reach the same conclusion. However, other authors use di¤erent data sets and statistical techniques to address the same ultimate question and reach the opposite conclusion, namely, that local investors are better informed than foreigners (e.g., Hau, 2001; Gri¢ n, Nardari, and Stulz, 2004; Choe, Kho, and Stulz, 2005; Dvorak, 2005; Menkho¤ and Schmeling, 2008) . In an attempt to reconcile the con ‡icting evidence, Froot and Ramadorai (2008) conjecture that foreigners have better information about macro fundamentals in emerging markets, whereas locals have better information about how individual …rms relate to each other.
The third way to verify whether foreigners trade on the basis of "worse" information sets than locals is to use survey data to directly compare the expectations of locals and foreigners.
Once again, the evidence is mixed. MacDonald and Marsh (1996) use survey data to compare G7 exchange rate forecasts made by …nancial institutions located in di¤erent countries.
While documenting substantial heterogeneity among individual forecasts, MacDonald and Marsh (1996) …nd negligible di¤erences among forecasts averaged across di¤erent forecasting locations. 7 In contrast, Berger, Ehrmann, and Fratzscher (2009) 
…nd that forecasters from
Frankfurt (where the European Central Bank is located) perform substantially better than other European forecasters when predicting monetary policy in the Euro area. Using data from the Institutional Brokers Estimate System (I/B/E/S), Bae, Stulz, and Tan (2008) show that local analysts tend to make smaller forecast errors than foreign analysts when predicting …rm-speci…c earnings. In contrast, Bacmann and Bolliger (2001) use a subset of the I/B/E/S data and …nd that foreign analysts outperform local ones when forecasting earnings of Latin American …rms, with the foreign outperformance being statistically signi…cant for Mexico and Colombia.
To the best of our knowledge, ours is the …rst study using survey data to document local informational advantage when it comes to forecasting a macroeconomic variable (the exchange rate). 
Exchange Rate Forecasts
We rely on exchange rate forecasts obtained from monthly surveys conducted by the Central There are 103 di¤erent forecasting institutions in our sample period. Most of these (88) are …nancial institutions, including banks and asset management …rms. The remaining institutions are either economic consulting …rms (9) or large non-…nancial …rms (6). We classify each forecasting institution as being locally owned or foreign-owned. There are 60 locally owned institutions, and 43 foreign-owned ones. Foreign-owned institutions include banks such as Citibank, Bank Tokyo-Mitsubishi, Deutsche Bank, and JP Morgan; economic consulting …rms such as IDEA Global; and non-…nancial …rms such as Telefónica.
Forecast Heterogeneity and Its Likely Source
We begin by documenting a large increase in the dispersion of exchange rate forecasts around The basic uncertainties were whether Lula would be elected president, and if he was elected president, whether he would retain the basic macroeconomic framework of his predecessors.
FIGURE 1
We observe expectations, but not information sets. Therefore, we cannot unequivocally tell whether the heterogeneity we document is mostly due to di¤erent private information or mostly due to agents interpreting public information in di¤erent ways. However, given the nature of the basic uncertainties bedeviling Brazilian markets at the time (regarding the outcome of the presidential election, or regarding Lula's macroeconomic framework if elected),
we are more sympathetic to the view that agents at the time had access to essentially the same information but "agreed to disagree" on its interpretation. 9 As Harris and Raviv (1993) state on page 474: "People often share common information yet disagree as to the meaning 9 In the context of the U.S. presidential election of 2008, Moretti and Lee (2009) study the relation between publically released poll information and prices in prediction markets. The authors show that rather than anticipating how the forthcoming polling numbers might be, prices in prediction markets used the changes in polls to update their forecasts of the …nal election outcome. Their evidence suggests there was no private information regarding the outcome of the election. of this information, not only in the evaluation of risky assets but also in the evaluation of political candidates, economic policies, and the outcome of horse races. One example of this is the variety of opinions among …nancial analysts and macroeconomists regarding future movements of interest rates, exchange rates, gross national product, and stock prices despite the fact that all these analysts have access to the same economic data." In Figures 2 through 5 we use the Central Bank surveys to verify whether the anecdotal di¤erence of opinions between local and foreigners was indeed of a systematic nature. Each month we compute the average forecast from locally and foreign-owned institutions for our four target dates and plot both average forecasts against the future realized exchange rate.
1 0 See also Kandel and Pearson (1995) .
At any point in time, the distance between each average forecast and the future realized exchange rate is the forecast error. Figures 2, 3 , 4, and 5 show that locally owned institutions made smaller forecast errors for all four target dates. 
Foreign Trading Imbalances and Market Prices
It seems natural that the divergence of expectations between locally and foreign-owned institutions would generate trading activity in …nancial markets. In this section we document that …nancial market data are consistent with foreigners becoming relatively more pessimistic than locals ahead of the 2002 elections. Using data on trading imbalances in the Brazilian stock exchange (BOVESPA) and the Brazilian exchange rate futures market (BM&F), we document that foreigners were net sellers of Brazilian stocks and the Brazilian currency ahead of the elections (i.e., locals were net buyers).
Did the foreign sell-o¤ exacerbate the depreciation of Brazilian equity and currency values?
Admittedly, it is very hard to provide an unequivocal empirical answer to this question. In this section we test whether periods of stronger foreign sell-o¤ (i.e., local buys) are associated with larger equity and currency declines. If foreign sales were unrelated to returns, the case for a worsening of price declines caused by foreign selling would be much weaker.
14 However, we …nd that periods of stronger foreign sell-o¤ were indeed associated with larger equity price declines and larger depreciation of the Brazilian Real in spot and futures markets.
Coupled with the survey results, this suggests that foreign trading exacerbated the decline in Brazilian equity and currency values during the crisis.
1 4 This is what Choe, Kho, and Stulz (1999) report. They state on page 231: "During the last three months of 1997 [the crisis period], days with large foreign net selling do not have signi…cant market-adjusted returns; even raw returns on these days are not signi…cantly negative. There is therefore no convincing evidence that foreign investors play a destabilizing role."
Stock Market
The BOVESPA Stock Exchange classi…es each participant in a stock trade as a domestic or a foreign trader. The exchange divulges data on the BRL amount transacted by each type of trader in both stock purchases and stock sales separately. The data is aggregated across all stocks in non-overlapping 10-day periods adding up to 36 periods per year. 15 We construct a Foreign Buys-Sells trading imbalance variable by subtracting the total BRL volume of sells by foreigners from the total BRL volume of buys by foreign investors in a given 10-day period. The variable is in billions of BRL. The …rst two columns of Table 2 Table 2 .
Admittedly, the results in Table 2 in isolation do not allow us to conclude that foreign selling exacerbated equity depreciation during the 2002 Brazilian crisis. It is possible that bad public news about the Brazilian economy drove both equity declines and foreign sales (i.e., local buys). In this case, equity declines would have been the same had foreigners not sold equity, because price changes would only re ‡ect the incorporation of public information into prices.
For example, Brennan and Cao (1997) However, our evidence includes not only the regressions in Table 2 but also the survey data previously discussed, and perhaps the anecdotal evidence provided by the New York Times article (Romero 2002) . Survey data show that foreigners became relatively more pessimistic than locals ahead of the 2002 elections. This relative change in beliefs is consistent with the overall foreign sales documented here and the correlation between Foreign Buys-Sells and IBOVESPA returns shown in Table 2 . Integrating the survey and regression results, the evidence suggests that foreign sales during the crisis exacerbated equity declines; i.e., equity declines would have been smaller had foreigners not become more pessimistic than locals and sold equity accordingly.
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In the last two columns of Table 2 we provide additional evidence that the 2002 period, marked by the emergence of foreign pessimism, was indeed di¤erent from other, less turbu-1 6 Note that the survey results are inconsistent with Brennan and Cao's (1997) theory. In their model, noise in signals is uncorrelated across investors. Therefore, expectations averaged across (large) groups of investors are identical because noise cancels out. That is, even though foreigners in Brennan and Cao's (1997) model have larger con…dence intervals around their expectations, on average they hold the same point estimates as locals. See Rubinstein (1974) and Dunne, Hau, and Moore (forthcoming) for models in which (exogenous) relative changes in beliefs drive trading and asset prices. 
Futures Exchange
In this section we repeat the analysis of the previous section using data from the BRL/USD market at the Brazilian BM&F futures exchange rather than stock market data. 17 The exchange classi…es each position (long or short) as being held by a local or a foreign trader.
For each future contract type, the exchange divulges the total number of long positions and the total number of short positions for each type of trader each day. 18 We add the foreign net (long BRL) position across all BRL/USD future contracts in a given day. In Figure 7 we plot the time evolution of the resulting Foreign Net BRL position (in USD billion) and compare it to the evolution of the BRL price of 1 USD according to the futures contract of the nearest maturity. Note that foreigners held a negative net long position in BRL during 2002; i.e., they were short BRL in the BM&F futures market. This is consistent with a structural desire to hedge the exchange rate exposure of investments in Brazil. The …rst column of Table 3 shows that Changes in Net Foreign BRL Position is positively associated with BRL Appreciation in the futures market in 2002. This is consistent with the foreign sell-o¤ of Brazilian currency in the futures market, driven by the emergence of foreign pessimism, exerting downward pressure on the Brazilian Real. Once again, the trading and price change data alone do not allow us to unequivocally state that foreign trading exacerbated the depreciation of the Brazilian currency in the futures market. However, this seems to be the most reasonable explanation, given the evidence from survey data.
The second column of Table 3 foreign investors'panic in explaining emerging market crises, the additional data point we provide helps to strengthen the latter factor vis-à-vis the former one. 
